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ABSTRACT
Traditionally, courts have applied a “customary practice”
standard in determining the legal standard of care in medical
malpractice cases. Recently, a few courts have abandoned this
dated standard and instead applied a Daubert analysis to the
standard of care, which focuses on medical evidence that is
scientifically based . In light of these recent holdings, this iBrief
argues that with the increasing amounts of technologies
improving evidence-based medicine, the customary practice
standard is no longer a useful or appropriate test for
determining the standard of care in medical malpractice cases.
By applying a Daubert analysis to an expert’s testimony on the
standard of care, the testimony becomes a scientifically based
testimony rather than an expert’s notion of what is common
practice in the medical profession.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
Recent split circuit court decisions signal a tension regarding
expert testimony in the area of medical malpractice. The issue is
whether the legal standard of care should be determined by expert
opinion informed by personal experience or informed by scientific
evidence. 2 Exclusive reliance on physician experience was justified
when there was no other information available, but new technology has
significantly improved research, allowing medicine to become
increasingly evidence-driven. 3
The introduction of such nascent
technology raises the question: Should physicians be allowed to testify
1
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about medical malpractice without taking modern medical technology
into account?
¶2
In many professions technology provides powerful information
helping to advance the field. Therefore, as technology facilitates the
growth of accessible medical information, it only seems natural that
physicians would utilize such information when determining how to treat
a patient. Yet, this is not the case. Today, most states permit physicians
to be protected by a customary standard designed by physicians. In order
to help initiate change, courts should hold physicians accountable for
knowing and incorporating modern medical information into the
physician’s method for treating a patient. Therefore, this iBrief argues
that in light of increasing amounts of technology providing better
information on medicine, customary practice is no longer an appropriate
test in evaluating a physician’s expert testimony and instead should be
replaced with a Daubert analysis.
¶3
The first part of this iBrief is an introduction to the elements
necessary for establishing medical malpractice. Part II of this iBrief
explores the weaknesses of a customary practice standard. Part III
describes how a Daubert analysis would be applied to determining the
medical standard of care. Part IV of this iBrief specifically discusses the
differences between a customary practice standard and a standard that
applies a Daubert analysis. Part V of this iBrief shows how a Daubert
analysis is compatible with the emerging reasonable physician standard.
Finally, Part VI of this iBrief discusses why applying a Daubert analysis
to the standard of care does not create a standard of care that is too
demanding for physicians.

I. ESTABLISHING A CLAIM FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR EXPERT TESTIMONY
To establish a claim for medical malpractice, a plaintiff must
show the following elements: (1) the applicable standard of care, (2)
breach of that standard of care by the defendant, (3) injury, and (4)
proximate causation between the alleged breach and the injury. 4 In
ordinary negligence cases, the standard of care is the degree of care that a
reasonable person of ordinary prudence would have exercised when in
the defendant’s situation or a similar circumstance. 5 However, for
medical malpractice, the standard of care is determined by looking at the
“degree of skill, care and learning which is possessed and exercised by
members of the medical profession in good standing.” 6
The
¶4
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conventional justification for the medical-custom standard is that lay
decision makers are more capable of determining what physicians
actually do than what physicians should do. 7 Moreover, it would be
difficult for a layman to determine what a doctor should have done
without having any knowledge of the profession. Therefore, in medical
malpractice cases, expert witnesses testify as to what the appropriate
standard of care should be.
¶5
An example of a medical malpractice case where experts
testified to the standard of care without using a Daubert analysis is
Kramer v. Milner. 8 There, an action was brought against the defendant
for negligently failing to recommend or order a screening mammogram
for the decedent who died from breast cancer. 9 According to the
defendant’s expert, the defendant was not negligent even though the
decedent was over fifty and the decedent’s sister had passed away from
breast cancer. 10 He stated that, because of the decedent’s age (seventy),
family history diminished in importance. Moreover, the decedent did not
complain about her breast during the three years she was treated by the
defendant. 11 Meanwhile, the plaintiff’s expert testified that the standard
of care required that an annual mammogram to be ordered for any
woman over fifty if her mother or sister had breast cancer. 12 The
plaintiff’s expert based this testimony on medical guidelines followed by
over eighty percent of physicians and suggested that, by not following
the guidelines, the defendant violated the standard of care. 13 In response,
the defendant’s expert testified that the guidelines were merely
recommendations or suggestions. 14 Ultimately, a jury decides which
expert is accurately determining the standard of care. 15 Therefore, final
decisions are often made without considering a Daubert analysis even
though the Daubert test was created to shed light on Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 , which governs expert testimony in federal courts. 16

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was interpreted by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. 17 Daubert

¶6
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3

2006

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 18

expressly covers expert testimony in federal courts, but it does not
necessarily apply to expert testimony in state courts. Because Daubert
only applies in federal courts, state courts are not obligated to apply
Daubert to an expert’s testimony on the standard of care. However,
states can adopt Daubert’s standard for admissibility of expert
testimony. 18
¶7
In Daubert, the Supreme Court created a test for the
admissibility of expert opinion. 19 Daubert held that trial judges should
determine “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid and . . . whether that reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” 20 Daubert’s
two-step inquiry requires trial judges to assess the relevance and
reliability of the expert’s testimony. 21 According to the Sixth Circuit, the
relevance requirement makes certain that there is a proper “fit” between
the expert’s testimony and the matter to be resolved at trial. 22 The
reliability prong focuses on the methodology and the principles
underlying the testimony. 23 Daubert suggested four factors in assessing
reliability: (1) the ability to test the opinion; (2) peer review and
publication; (3) potential rate of error; and (4) general acceptance in the
relevant scientific community. 24 Such a test permits judges to exclude
expert testimonies based on junk science.

II. THE WEAKNESSES OF USING THE CUSTOMARY-CARE STANDARD
WHEN DETERMINING THE STANDARD OF CARE
¶8
There are significant downfalls in determining the standard of
care by solely looking at customary practice. First, there may be no
customs in a world where there are various medical options for the same
problem. Second, custom itself may be negligent. Third, experts
(sometimes referred to as the “hired guns”) may be biased and provide
unreliable testimony. Fourth, customary practice permits an inefficient
medical system to remain at odds with emerging evidence-based
medicine.
¶9
First, not even physicians agree on customary care in particular
cases, suggesting that a singular custom oftentimes does not exist. The
standard of care for medical malpractice cases must be proven by expert
18
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testimony outlining the prevailing medical custom. 25 These physician
expert witnesses are asked to explain what is ordinarily done in
circumstances similar to the issue of concern, but it is unclear how these
physicians know what is ordinarily done. 26 In fact, they may simply be
explaining what they would have done and assume that it is what other
physicians would have done as well. 27
¶10
When the testimony involves areas with no agreement on the
standards of practice, a jury is likely to hear mutually exclusive
testimonies. This is not to suggest that there should be only one standard
of practice, 28 but rather that one custom does not exist. This should not
be surprising considering science often leads to dissimilar scientific
conclusions and physicians will respond to these various conclusions
differently. Moreover, the growth of technology has increased a
physician’s possible alternatives for treating a patient. 29 Having a
variety of caretaking approaches for the same medical condition makes it
even more difficult to identify a medical custom because it is unlikely
that just one custom even exists. 30
¶11
The controversy of whether a customary practice exists was
illustrated by the Kramer case where the plaintiff’s expert felt that the
American Cancer Society’s recommendation (annual mammograms for
women over fifty if there is a family history of cancer) was the standard
of care because it was customary to follow their suggestions. 31
Meanwhile, the defendant’s expert felt that, because there were several
guidelines with different recommendations, there was no uniform
guideline for practitioners. 32

Second, the custom itself may be a negligent standard of care. 33
Normally, customary practice is not conclusive evidence of what the
standard of care is, but in medical malpractice cases, custom is typically

¶12

25

John W. Ely et al., Determining the Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice:
the Physician’s Perspectives, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 861, 864–65 (2002).
26
Id. at 865.
27
Id.
28
HAVIGHURST supra note 4, at 1030 (arguing that reconciling scientific
disputes is not in the public interest and is possibly an anti-trust violation).
29
HAVIGHURST, supra note 4, at 1013 (citing Henderson & Siciliano, Universal
Health and the Continued Reliance on Custom in Determining Malpractice, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 1382, 1389–91(1994)).
30
HENDERSON & SICILIANO, supra note 29, at 1390–91.
31
Kramer v. Milner, 639 N.E.2d 157, 158 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
32
Id. at 159.
33
Paula Sweeney, Medical Malpractice Expert Testimony in Texas, 41 S. TEX.
L. REV. 517, 525 (2000).
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the exclusive measure of due care. 34
This can be particularly
problematic when the customary practice standard appears to be too low.
¶13
An illustration of when customary medical standards are indeed
too low was seen in Helling v. Carey. 35 In Helling, the plaintiff could
have retained her eyesight had the defendant physician detected her
condition by administering a simple glaucoma test and taken
preventative measures. 36
Nevertheless, the defendant, an
ophthalmologist, complied with the standard of his profession, which did
not require a routine pressure test for persons under forty years of age. 37
Therefore, the defendant acted within the standard of his profession 38
and normally would not have been found negligent. However, the
Helling court stated that “it is the duty of the courts to say what is
required to protect patients under 40 from the damaging results of
glaucoma,” 39 thereby shifting from implementing the traditional
customary practice standard to the reasonable prudence standard. Under
the reasonable prudence standard the defendant was negligent as a matter
of law. 40 Helling highlights how a court had to deviate from the
customary practice standard in order to prevent the low customary
standard from shielding a negligent physician.

Third, many physicians who participate in providing expert
testimony are “driven solely by financial reward and not the pursuit of
sound medical principles.” 41 Such financial motives are likely to
influence an expert’s testimony and create incentives for deliberate or
subconscious biases and distortions of facts. 42

¶14

¶15
Fourth, clinical research evidence (evidence-based medicine)
proves that customary standards are inefficient. A report from the 1980s
showed that only fifteen percent of medical practices were based on
clinical trials. 43 Meanwhile, clinical trials have proven that some of the
common practices used by physicians are ineffective. 44 Without solid
34

HAVIGHURST , supra note 4, at 1001.
Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974).
36
Id. at 981–82.
37
Id. at 982.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 983.
40
Id. at 984.
41
David B. Brown & O. William Brown, The Expert Medical Witness in the
State of Michigan: A Cause For Concern, 9 MICH. ST. J. MED. & LAW 279, 286
(2005).
42
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43
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44
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evidence for many customary practices, 45 doctors continue to perform
inefficient treatment.
¶16
Applying a Daubert analysis resolves many of the weaknesses
with the traditional customs standard. It ensures that expert opinion is
grounded in scientifically sound principles and methodologies.
Published research suggests the finding is methodologically sound
because the work has “weathered peer review.” 46 Judges and juries will
only hear evidence that the medical community considers real science.
This means that a so-called expert cannot testify as to what he suspects
the community is doing based on the expert’s experience, notions, and
feelings. Instead, applying Daubert means the expert is well informed
on research evidence regarding the issue in question. Being informed on
these matters makes sense in a world where increasing developments in
technology provide increasing amounts of information and research,
helping to determine whether medical treatments are safe and efficient.
Therefore, evidence-based medicine creates compelling reasons for
experts to testify to the science of a medical treatment rather than to what
the experts suspects the customary treatment is. Testimonies on the
science means physicians cannot be found non-negligent just because
they hid behind customary standards when research shows that the
treatment in question is harmful or ineffective.

III. APPLYING DAUBERT TO THE STANDARD OF CARE
There appear to be two specific ways of applying Daubert to
the standard of care in medical malpractice cases. It can either exclude
expert opinion grounded on incorrect factual assumptions, or it can be
used to ensure that the expert’s opinion regarding the standard of care is
based on valid science.

¶17

¶18
First, Daubert can be used to withhold expert opinion that is
based on incorrect factual assumptions as seen in Berk v. St. Vincent’s
Hospital and Medical Center. 47 In Berk, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant was negligent for not advising him to seek immediate medical
attention after the plaintiff called the defendant physician and informed
the physician of orange fluid that was draining out of the plaintiff’s knee
after surgery. 48 The plaintiff’s expert’s opinion was premised on the
belief that the plaintiff complained to the defendant of redness, swelling,
and drainage, however the plaintiff stated that he only complained to

45

Id.
Mello, supra note 2, at 857.
47
Berk v. St. Vincent’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 380 F. Supp. 2d 334, 353 (D.N.Y.
2005).
48
Id. at 339.
46
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defendant of orange drainage. 49
Because the plaintiff’s expert’s
testimony was formulated around inaccurate facts, it failed to meet the
reliability prong of Daubert and was excludable. 50
Second, Daubert can be used to ensure that the expert’s
testimony is methodologically sound as seen in the lower court’s
decision in Dickenson v. Cardiac & Thoracic Surgery of E. Tenn, P.C. 51
In Dickenson, the plaintiff underwent heart bypass surgery followed by
postoperative respiratory care. 52 After removal of her ventilation tube,
the plaintiff suffered brain damage due to insufficient oxygen. 53 The
plaintiff’s estate alleged the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by premature
removal of the ventilation tube following surgery. 54 After applying a
Daubert analysis, the district court rejected a cardiac surgeon’s testimony
on the standard of care for extubation of a ventilating tube, which is
typically performed by a pulmonologist. The district court noted that: (1)
the expert knew very little about ventilating medical equipment and the
settings to be used; (2) the expert had never written an article on
pulmonology; (3) the expert could not identify any articles about
pulmonology that he had read; and (4) there was no peer review of his
opinion regarding defendant’s negligence. 55 Therefore, the court applied
Daubert in order to consider whether the expert’s testimony was
grounded in reliable science before permitting him to speak on what the
standard of care is.
¶19

¶20
While ensuring that the expert’s opinion regarding the standard
of care is based on valid science, a Daubert analysis also remains
flexible enough to permit testimony that is not explicitly supported by
texts. For instance, the court in Sullivan v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy 56
questioned whether the texts used to support an expert’s testimony
needed to state the precise type of harm explained by the expert. 57 In
Sullivan, the plaintiff found a hole in her back after she had surgery that
removed breast cancer and reconstructed her breast. 58 The reconstructive
surgery lasted over thirteen hours. 59 The plaintiff’s expert testified that,

49

Id. at 353.
Id. at n. 25.
51
Dickenson v. Cardiac & Thoracic Surgery of E. Tenn., P.C., 388 F.3d 976
passim (6th Cir. 2004).
52
Id. at 977–78.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 979–80.
56
365 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2004).
57
Id. at 834.
58
Id. at 829–30.
59
Id.
50
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normally, such reconstruction takes three to four hours to perform 60 and
that “the excessive length of the surgery increased the risk of infection by
at least six times.” 61
The expert deduced that the defendant’s
performance was below the standard of care because the reconstructive
surgery lasted drastically longer than usual. 62 The trial court felt that the
expert did not present the steps she used to reach her conclusion and that
literature describing the effect of operative length on the incidence of
surgical wound infections was not the same as the effect of operative
length on the incidence of surgical drain infections.63 As a result, the trial
court found that the plaintiff’s scientific literature did not support the
expert’s opinion. 64
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the trial court in Sullivan.65
The court stated that textbooks cannot be expected to say what the
probable increase in the risk of infection is in specific cases; experts’
experience suggests those estimates. 66 For the district court to require
texts to state the precise type of harm explained by the testimony of a
medical expert is an abuse of discretion. 67 Therefore, applying Daubert
does not mean experts must find data that specifically corroborates their
testimony. Instead, there remains room for experts to supplant their
testimony with their own experience.
¶21

IV. DIVIDED COURTS: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A DAUBERT
COURT AND A CUSTOMARY STANDARD COURT
Despite the emergence of new technologies permitting scientific
methods to help determine the standard of care in medical malpractice
cases, only two circuits and one state court have addressed the issue. In
Sullivan, the Ninth Circuit embraced a Daubert analysis when
determining the standard of care. 68 Meanwhile, the Sixth Circuit rejected
such use of Daubert in Dickenson. 69 The trial court in Massachusetts
adopted a Daubert analysis, but the Appeals Court and the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts then rejected applying Daubert to the standard of
care. The cases convey why new technologies could change how we
¶22

60

Id. at 830.
Id. at 831.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 832.
65
Id. at 829.
66
Id. at 834.
67
Id.
68
See supra text accompanying notes 56–66.
69
Dickenson v. Cardiac & Thoracic Surgery of E. Tenn., P.C., 388 F.3d 976,
982 (6th Cir. 2004); see supra text accompanying notes 52–55 (discussing
district court’s reasons for excluding expert’s testimony).
61
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traditionally determine the standard of care. Moreover, these cases
highlight the differences between a court applying Daubert and those
maintaining the traditional standard of care.
Although the Ninth Circuit held that the trial court applied an
excessively rigid Daubert analysis in Sullivan, the Ninth Circuit still
embraced applying Daubert to the standard of care. 70 Moreover, the
Ninth Circuit suggested that the expert’s testimony should be admitted
because the opinion met the relevance and reliability prong of Daubert. 71
¶23

Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit rejected the use of
Daubert to determine the standard of care. In Dickenson, the Sixth
Circuit stated Daubert’s role of excluding junk science from courts is not
served by excluding testimony from a practitioner with extensive
relevant experience. 72 It is unclear whether the Sixth Circuit altogether
rejects Daubert or just believes the district court inappropriately applied
the test. However, there are reasons to suspect the court altogether
rejects applying Daubert to the standard of care. Although the court
mentions that the physician has extensive relevant experience, that is not
the same as the relevance of his or her testimony (one of the Daubert
prongs). For example, a cardiac surgeon may have relevant experience
in extubation, but if he testifies about boat manufacturing in a medical
malpractice claim, his testimony would not be relevant to the issue at
hand and therefore excludable. Because the Sixth Circuit does not
explicitly discuss and analyze the relevance or reliability of an expert’s
testimony, it appears as though the court altogether rejects the district
court’s Daubert analysis.
¶24

Palandjian v. Foster 73 was also a case where a higher court
overturned the application of a Daubert analysis to the standard of care. 74
In Palandjian, the plaintiff died from gastric cancer and his estate filed a
claim for medical malpractice against defendant physician and
radiologists. 75 The decedent’s grandmother and paternal aunt had also
died from gastric cancer. 76 In order for plaintiff’s expert to testify that
there is an increased risk of gastric cancer in patients with two or more
second degree relatives who also had gastric cancer, the plaintiff’s expert
had to provide Daubert-type evidence to support the statement. 77 In the
lower court, the plaintiffonly provided data to support the controversial
¶25

70

Sullivan, 365 F.3d at 833.
Id.
72
Dickenson, 388 F.3d at 982.
73
842 N.E.2d 916 (Mass. 2006).
74
Id. at 925.
75
Id. at 918.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 919–20.
71
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belief that patients with a family history of gastric cancer among first
degree relatives face an increased risk of gastric cancer. 78 Failing to
meet the Daubert standard, the supreme judicial court affirmed the trial
court’s decision to exclude the evidence. 79
¶26
The Appeals Court of Massachusetts in Palandjian vacated the
judgment against the physician after holding that the trial judge erred in
excluding the expert's opinion. 80 According to the Appeals Court, the
expert’s opinion only applied to the standard of care by suggesting that
physicians exercise increased caution when dealing with a family history
of gastric cancer. 81 Therefore, it was not the type of scientific evidence
that must be screened for reliability by a judge. 82 The Supreme Court of
Massachusetts agreed and maintained that the standard of care is
determined by the care customarily provided by other physicians and that
it does not have to be scientifically tested or proven effective. 83
¶27
Without a Daubert analysis, the higher courts in Dickenson and
Palandjian accepted expert testimony because the opinions were based
on the experts’ knowledge of care provided by other qualified
physicians. This means a court applying the traditional standard of care
is less interested in the methodology underlying the expert’s opinion and
more interested in the experience and education of the expert. Without
applying Daubert in Dickenson, a cardiac surgeon became an expert on
pulmonology because of the physician’s experience working with
pulmonoligsts, even though the expert had little knowledge about
ventilating medical equipment, could not identify articles about
pulmonology which he had read, and had no peer review regarding his
opinion on defendant’s negligence. In other words, without the court
applying Daubert, a cardiac surgeon suddenly became an expert on
pulmonology. Additionally, without a Daubert analysis, Palandjian
suggests an expert can testify that there is an increased risk of gastric
cancer in patients with two or more second degree relatives who also had
the disease even though the expert has no evidence to support his
opinion. These are precisely the results a Daubert analysis would not
permit. Instead, applying Daubert to the standard of care means the

78

Id.
Id. at 925.
80
Id. at 918.
81
Id. at 920.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 921.
79
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expert’s testimony must be underlined with valid scientific theory or
research. 84

V. DAUBERT AND THE REASONABLE PHYSICIAN STANDARD
¶28
Applying Daubert to an expert’s testimony on the standard of
care does not conflict with the increasing shift from a custom-based
standard to a reasonable physician standard. Recently, over forty percent
of states have moved from the customary standard to a reasonable
physician standard of care. 85 The reasonable physician standard is
applied by determining what the ordinary reasonable physician would do
under the circumstances. 86 Custom is just one bit of evidence
considered, but it is not dispositive. 87 Ultimately, the inquiry for the jury
is whether the defendant failed to act as a reasonably prudent
physician. 88 Therefore, unlike the traditional standard of care, this
standard leaves room for considering whether the rendered medical care
was scientifically valid.
¶29
The reasonable standard of care was applied in Hood v.
Phillips. 89 In Hood, the defendant physician performed carotid surgery
as treatment for the plaintiff with emphysema. The plaintiff’s experts
testified that such surgery was an unaccepted method of treatment, a
treatment with no support from medical evidence, and a treatment
already shown to be ineffective and abandoned by other physicians. 90
The court determined that the standard of care is what a reasonable and
prudent member of the medical profession would have done in the same
or similar circumstances. 91 This reasonable and prudent standard permits
physicians the ability to experiment in medical science by utilizing
experimental, out-moded, and rejected surgical procedures as a last resort
if other physicians in a similar circumstance would do the same. 92
Therefore, the reasonable physician standard differs from the customary
standard because it asks what a reasonable physician would do rather
than simply asking what is customarily done. (Although, in some
circumstance a reasonable physician may be a physician that follows
84

Dickenson v. Cardiac & Thoracic Surgery of E. Tenn., P.C., 388 F.3d 976,
978–80 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that the district court rejected the expert’s
testimony because he did not consult medical articles when deriving an opinion).
85
Philip G. Peters Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice
Law at the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 184 (2000).
86
Sweeney, supra note 33, at 525–26.
87
Id.
88
Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. 1977).
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
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custom.) This means physicians who follow the pack are not necessarily
immunized from negligence liability.
¶30
A Daubert analysis can be applied in states using a reasonable
physician standard because such states require the plaintiff's expert to
testify about what other reasonable doctors in a similar circumstance
would have done. 93 Similar to the customary standard, the expert can
either devise his opinion based on his own notions and feelings or his
testimony can actually be grounded in scientific evidence. The Daubert
analysis is for the purposes of ensuring the scientific basis of an expert’s
underlying testimony is valid. If based on legitimate science, the
expert’s testimony will pass the Daubert test. Once the expert’s
testimony passes the Daubert test, the expert can testify as to what a
reasonable physician would have done.

VI. WHY APPLYING DAUBERT DOES NOT MAKE THE STANDARD OF
CARE TOO DEMANDING
¶31
Although physicians may be concerned that applying Daubert
will cause the standard of care to be unreasonably demanding, there are
several factors to remember. First, under Daubert, a physician’s
experience is still taken into account. Second, customs are also factored
into a Daubert analysis. Third, physicians are not held accountable for
information that was unknown at the time of the alleged negligence.

First, a physician’s experience will still be considered when
determining an expert’s qualifications. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 has
been interpreted to mean: “(1) the expert must be qualified to testify, by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; (2) the testimony
must concern scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge; and
(3) the testimony must be such as to assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” 94 Therefore, the rule for
expert admissibility expresses that an expert may qualify on the basis of
experience. For example, in Regions Bank v. Hagaman 95 expert
testimony was accepted even though the expert's opinion was not
specifically supported by articles because the expert’s outstanding
credentials were a factor favoring admissibility. 96 If the hesitancy in
applying Daubert is that it will reject testimony from highly skilled
physicians, then Federal Rule of Evidence 702 mitigates that fear. This is
an important feature of the Daubert rule because both the Sixth Circuit
and the Paladjian court were opposed to rejecting expert witnesses after
¶32

93

Sweeney, supra note 33, at 522.
Perez-Viera v. United States, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15841, at *4 (D.P.R.
Aug. 11, 2004) (citing United States v. Corey, 207 F.3d 84, 88 (1st Cir. 2000)).
95
84 S.W.3d 66 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002).
96
Id. at 70.
94
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considering their lengthy experiences (even though they had no scientific
evidence to back up their statements).
Second, customary practice is also considered in a Daubert
analysis. The Palandjian court stated it is difficult to imagine how
Daubert, “with its emphasis on methodology, would apply to testimony
concerning the standard of care. Because the standard of care is
determined by the care that the average qualified physician would
provide, it is ‘generally accepted’ almost by definition.” 97 In other
words, the court must think that by definition customary practice is
“generally accepted” under a Daubert analysis. Although the reasoning
is valid, the statement highlights the court’s misunderstanding of the
difference between the Frye test and the Daubert rule.
¶33

¶34
The Frye decision focused on general acceptance in the scientific
community as the sole criterion for the admissibility of scientific
evidence. 98 Under Frye, customary practice would be substantially
similar if not the same as general acceptance. However, Frye was
superseded by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which was interpreted in
Daubert. Under Daubert, several factors are weighed to determine the
validity of the science such as: the ability to test the opinion; peer review
and publication; and potential rate of error. 99 It is important to note that
general acceptance is also one of the several factors that can be used. 100
As the Dickenson court points out, custom is by definition generally
accepted and since general acceptance is part of the Daubert analysis,
then by definition, custom is also part of a Daubert analysis.
¶35
Third, a Daubert analysis only holds physicians accountable for
information that was known at the time of the alleged negligence. For
instance, in Palandjian, expert testimony referred to an article published
over ten years after the alleged negligence. 101 The court stated, “a
physician cannot be held to a standard of care based on medical research
and literature not in existence at the time of the alleged negligence.” 102
Moreover, if the concern is that physicians will have to stay well
informed about new research and medical information, one must
remember that the customs standard is also not a stagnant standard.
Further, it is not unreasonable to expect physicians, who are
professionals, to stay well informed about new medical information.

97

Palandjian v. Foster, 842 N.E.2d 916, 924 n.12 (Mass. 2006).
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
99
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).
100
Id.
101
Palandjian, 842 N.E.2d at 926.
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CONCLUSION
¶36
Because new technologies are quickly improving our
understanding of science and medicine, physicians should be held to a
standard of care that utilizes this new wave of scientific evidence.
Rather than relying on customary practice, medical malpractice cases
should question whether the physician practiced in a way that is
consistent with legitimate science. The Daubert rule reaches this
question by ensuring an expert’s opinion is grounded in valid science
before the expert can testify as to what the standard of care is. The effect
is that medical malpractice no longer rests on what physicians do, but
instead assess whether a physician acted in accordance with valid science
and good medicine.
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